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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Debra Milke learned her four-year-old son had been 
murdered, she was sitting in a medical office in the Pinal County 
Sheriff’s Department.1  At the end of her interview with Detective 
Armando Saldate, Jr., she supposedly confessed to having her son killed 
by two men: James Styers and Roger Scott.2  The prosecution’s case 
rested on the unwritten, unsigned, unrecorded, and unwitnessed 
confession based on Detective Saldate’s testimony.3  Despite her pleas of 
innocence, a jury convicted her, and a judge sentenced her to death.4  
Thirteen years later, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted her a 
conditional writ of habeas corpus based on prosecutorial misconduct that 
occurred in her trial.5  While the Ninth Circuit found the actions of the 
Maricopa County Prosecutor’s Office and Phoenix Police Department 
constitutionally egregious, it could only grant her relief if it found the 
state court decisions failed to reasonably apply the Brady v. Maryland 
doctrine in all of its rulings.6  When the Arizona state courts reviewed 
Ms. Milke’s case on both direct appeal and post-conviction, both courts 
found Miranda7 and Brady8 challenges were without merit.9  All federal 
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 1.   See Milke v. Schriro, No. CV-98-0060-PHX-RCB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86708, at *14–
15 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2006), rev’d sub nom. Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 2.   See Milke, 711 F.3d at 1002. 
 3.   See id. 
 4.   See id. 
 5.   See id. at 1019. 
 6.   See id. at 1003. 
 7.   Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that before custodial interrogations, the 
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courts were statutorily required to abide by the state court’s merits 
finding so long as it was not an unreasonable use of federal precedent.10  
Such deference, while successful here, often fails when other forms of 
police or prosecutorial misconduct happen. 
The Fourteenth Amendment due process challenges that Ms. Milke 
made asserting both police and prosecutorial misconduct were not 
isolated incidents.  While she specifically demonstrated how Detective 
Saldate acted improperly during her interrogation, the Ninth Circuit’s 
opinion discussed the pattern of misconduct the Detective engaged in 
over several years.11  The Detective’s actions not only placed Ms. Milke 
on death row, but also affected countless other defendants.  When state 
actors, be they police, prosecutors, or both, behave outside the law, 
countless defendants are impacted with potentially very little recourse.  
In many instances, the official misconduct is not pled during a 
defendant’s direct appeal or post-conviction proceedings because it may 
be unknown.  Official misconduct occurs when police or prosecutors 
violate a person’s constitutional rights.  However, official misconduct is 
often not an isolated incident.  Instead, systemic official misconduct is 
seen in various police departments and prosecutors’ offices across the 
country.12  Systemic official misconduct involves institutionally 
mandated violations over time. 
Over the past few years, courts and state bar associations have paid 
considerably more attention to the misconduct of police and prosecutors 
on the state level.13  Courts are growing more concerned with the 
systematic impact this misconduct has not only on individual cases, but 
also on how it undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system.  
                                                          
police must inform the accused of the right to remain silent, the right to an attorney, and that any 
statement may be used against him in a court of law). 
 8.  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (finding that the prosecution’s withholding of 
evidence favorable to the accused during any phase of a trial is a due process violation). 
 9.   State v. Milke, 865 P.2d 779, 791 (Ariz. 1993); Milke v. Schriro, No. CV-98-0060-PHX-
RCB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86708, at *2 (D. Ariz. Nov. 27, 2006), rev’d sub nom. Milke v. Ryan, 
711 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 10.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012). 
 11.   Milke, 711 F.3d at 1003. 
 12.   See infra notes 149–181 and accompanying text for examples of systemic official 
misconduct. 
 13.   See generally Bruce Green & Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Accountability 2.0, 92 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 51 (2016) (discussing the evolution of the response to prosecutorial 
misconduct by the judiciary, public, and state bars); J. Thomas Sullivan, Brady Misconduct 
Remedies: Prior Jeopardy and Ethical Discipline of Prosecutors, 68 ARK. L. REV. 1011 (2016) 
(examining an Arkansas capital murder case involving prosecutors withholding exculpatory 
evidence and their referral to the state bar for discipline). 
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Research has shown that when prosecutorial misconduct is not addressed 
by courts, the malfeasance increases.14  Examples of prosecutorial 
misconduct include withholding exculpatory evidence, making false 
statements to the court, falsifying evidence, and paying witnesses 
without disclosing it to the defense, among others.15  Due to flaws in 
many state appellate and collateral proceedings, it is difficult for state 
judges to remedy systemic official misconduct.16 
The question remains as to what relief exists for inmates in federal 
habeas corpus when state courts rule on systemic official misconduct 
constitutional claims.  The federal habeas statute requires that an inmate 
must raise any constitutional violations in either their direct appeal or 
state post-conviction proceedings for exhaustion purposes.17  The state 
must have the first opportunity to rectify any constitutional defects in a 
state inmate’s conviction before a federal court may review the claim.18  
Because an inmate must first present his claims in state court, that inmate 
should have access to the necessary evidence to substantiate his claims in 
order for the state court to properly evaluate their merits.  However, that 
rarely happens.  Instead, inmates who request access to evidence are 
often denied, and their constitutional challenges are denied.19  Such state 
court merits determinations severely restrict a federal court’s review 
during habeas corpus.  Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
                                                          
 14.   See Harry Mitchell Caldwell, Everybody Talks About Prosecutorial Conduct but 
Nobody Does Anything About It: A 25-Year Survey of Prosecutorial Misconduct and a Viable 
Solution, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1455, 1458, 1479 (2017) (analyzing a “survey of twenty-five years of 
California Supreme Court criminal opinions”). 
 15.   See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016: THE NATIONAL 
REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 6–7 (2017), https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/ 
Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf (showing that over half of all 2016 homicide exonerations in 
this country have some form of official misconduct as a contributing factor, and “[f]orty-two percent 
of exonerations in 2016 included official misconduct (70/166).  Official misconduct encompasses a 
range of behavior—from police threatening witnesses to forensic analysts falsifying test results to 
child welfare workers pressuring children to claim sexual abuse where none occurred.  But the most 
common misconduct documented in the cases in the Registry involves police or prosecutors (or 
both) concealing exculpatory evidence.  The proportion of exonerations with official misconduct is 
the highest among homicide cases—more than two-thirds of the homicide exonerations involved 
misconduct by official actors (42/54).”). 
 16.   See Aziz Z. Huq, Habeas and the Roberts Court, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 521, 551 (2014) 
(discussing the lack of effective or any defense counsel in all facets of state criminal proceedings 
resulting in constitutional violations going unchallenged). 
 17.   See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 515–19 (1982) (discussing Congress’s codification of 
the exhaustion doctrine in the federal habeas statute); Wainwright v. Skyes, 433 U.S. 72, 80–81 
(1977) (discussing the exhaustion requirement in state court of constitutional claims and why it is 
necessary). 
 18.   See id. 
 19.   See Tiffany Murphy, The Futility of Exhaustion: Why Brady Claims Should Trump 
Federal Exhaustion Requirements, 47 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 697, 708–09 (2014). 
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Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal courts must give utmost deference when 
state courts reach the merits of constitutional claims. 
Both scholars and judges agree that the AEDPA’s deference standard 
stands as a consistent impediment even when it is obvious that 
constitutional violations have occurred.  For deference to apply to an 
inmate’s constitutional claim, it must have been reviewed on the merits 
in either direct appeal or collateral review.  Upon reaching federal 
habeas, the district court is statutorily required to evaluate the state 
court’s decision only for an “unreasonable application of clearly 
established Federal law” and must consider whether “fairminded jurists 
could disagree.”20  Federal judges are no longer focused on whether an 
inmate’s conviction is constitutionally invalid but instead on whether the 
state court’s ruling had a reasonable legal basis. 
The criminal justice system relies on The Great Writ as a legal 
mechanism to address when state actors unconstitutionally infringe on an 
inmate’s rights.21  Official misconduct is a classic example of when 
federal habeas corpus should closely examine the extent of the 
misconduct and the severity of its impact on an inmate’s rights.  
However, the AEDPA limits federal courts’ ability to address the crux of 
an official misconduct constitutional claim.22  The deference standard 
requires a federal judge to determine whether a state court’s merits ruling 
was either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law” or an “unreasonable determination of the 
facts” when considering the state court evidence.23  While federal courts 
are willing to find state court determinations unreasonable if a Brady 
claim is at issue, the same cannot be said for other forms of systematic 
official misconduct.  However, if an inmate’s claim asserts other types of 
official misconduct, a federal court is more apt to find the claim 
unreachable because of the mandated deference standard. 
Debra Milke’s case is a classic example of the state court’s failure to 
properly evaluate her claims of police and prosecutorial misconduct 
before denying them both on the merits and requiring her to try her luck 
on federal habeas corpus review.  Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Chief 
                                                          
 20.   Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101–02 (2011) (internal quotations omitted) (citing 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) and Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). 
 21.   See ANDREA D. LYON ET AL., FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS xiv (2005). 
 22.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012); see also Justin Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process 
Rather than the Result, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 85, 107–24 (2012) (discussing the impact of 
various Supreme Court cases on the deference standard of the AEDPA). 
 23.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2) (2012). 
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Justice Alex Kozinski found several lapses in the state court’s evaluation 
of Ms. Milke’s claims when evaluating them under § 2254(d)(1). 
Instead of examining this claim in light of Giglio—asking whether the 
evidence was favorable, whether it should have been disclosed and 
whether the defendant suffered prejudice—the state court focused on 
the discoverability of the evidence and the specificity of the claim.  
This is not the inquiry called for by long-standing Supreme Court 
caselaw.  Because the state court focused on the wrong questions in 
denying Milke’s impeachment-evidence claim, it applied the wrong 
legal framework.  Its decision is thus “contrary to . . . clearly 
established Federal law” and unworthy of AEDPA deference.24 
Additionally, he found the state post-conviction court failed to 
properly evaluate the factual basis of Milke’s Brady claim, thereby 
running afoul of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).25  Throughout the Ninth 
Circuit’s discussion of the deference standard, it pointed out the failure 
of the prosecution to comply with discovery at every level of appeals, 
including federal habeas corpus.  Specifically, the prosecution neglected 
to fully disclose the scope of Detective Saldate’s misconduct in other 
cases and in internal documentation within the police department.26  This 
evidence constituted impeachment evidence that must be disclosed under 
Brady and its progeny.27  While Milke requested this evidence during her 
pretrial proceedings, the failure to disclose illustrates the problem of 
deference which the state appellate and collateral proceedings 
compounded.28  Milke’s case demonstrates the haphazard review 
provided in state court when official misconduct is at issue.  Further, it 
shows the extensive evaluation a federal court must have to bypass the 
deference standard that often prevents it from addressing viable 
constitutional violations. 
This article discusses the substantial issues surrounding the 
AEDPA’s deference standard when an inmate raises constitutional 
claims of state actors acting improperly.  Specifically, federal courts 
should not give deference to state court merits rulings when based on 
systemic official misconduct.  Often, state courts struggle with applying 
federal constitutional jurisprudence in collateral proceedings.  They fail 
to permit discovery or evaluate the claims as federal courts have 
                                                          
 24.   Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1006–07 (9th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). 
 25.   See id. at 1007–08. 
 26.   See id. at 1010–11. 
 27.   U.S. v. Giglio, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972). 
 28.   See Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d at 1004–05. 
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established is required.  Because the pattern of police or prosecutorial 
malfeasance keeps critical information from the inmate, state actors 
should not benefit from the AEDPA’s intent for high deference to state 
court findings.  This is especially true when state appellate procedure 
fails to give a full and fair opportunity to develop the claim.  Instead, the 
federal court should review these claims de novo or review them under 
the looser framework of § 2254(d)(2), which is rarely used.29 
Part Two of this article examines the history of the deference 
standard as evaluated by various habeas scholars.  This discussion 
focuses on the Supreme Court’s problematic interpretation of the 
deference standard, and examines why the state review process should 
not be given deference.  The third part defines what official misconduct 
is, the prevalence of that misconduct, and the limitations on state courts 
in fixing their own mistakes.  The fourth section of this article discusses 
how federal courts should avail themselves of (d)(2) deference review, 
which provides some means of assessing whether the state proceedings 
were full and fair.  Doing so protects not only the original intent of the 
Great Writ but ensures the protections of individual rights from 
unconstitutional overreaching by errant police and prosecutors. 
II. DEFERENCE: HOW DID WE GET HERE? 
As the Milke case illustrates, the deference standard requires any 
federal court to examine whether a state court’s ruling was unreasonable 
in the application of federal law or of fact before it addresses a claim on 
the merits.  In practice, the deference standard often prevents a federal 
judge from addressing a constitutional issue on its substance.  Unlike 
most of the Supreme Court-driven changes in the application of the Great 
Writ, the deference standard was a congressional change.30  As such, 
Congress gave little discussion on why it enacted it.  Ever since, the 
Supreme Court and lower federal courts have struggled on what the 
standard means and how it should be interpreted. 
A. Congressional enactment of § 2254(d) 
After the Oklahoma City bombing, Congress took the opportunity to 
streamline what it saw as a litigious and unnecessary slowing down of 
                                                          
 29.   Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), federal courts review the state court record concerning the 
factual allegations in ascertaining whether the state court acted unreasonably.  Federal courts may 
consider the applicant’s ability to develop the facts under this provision. 
 30.   See Marceau, supra note 22, at 93. 
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capital punishment during federal habeas corpus.31  Many of the changes 
that the Supreme Court enacted over the last ten years were codified in 
the new habeas statute.32  This included the exhaustion requirement, 
stricter standards for granting evidentiary hearings, and a higher burden 
of proof for successor petitions.33  However, the deference standard was 
an addition not contemplated by federal courts.34  Instead, Congress 
added key provisions limiting federal courts from granting writs of 
habeas corpus by enacting a strict one-year statute of limitations along 
with the deference standard.35  In an effort to seize the political moment, 
several Republicans fast-tracked the bill by limiting commenting and not 
discussing its impact with federal habeas practitioners or debating with 
Democrats on the issue.36  The AEDPA passed both houses by wide 
majorities and was signed into law by President Clinton in April 1996.37 
The new deference standard applied only when state courts decided a 
constitutional claim on the merits.38  In other words, only when the state 
court reaches the substantive constitutional issue would a federal court 
defer to that ruling in federal habeas corpus.  “It also requires federal 
courts to focus on the wisdom, or lack thereof, of a state court’s decision 
                                                          
 31.   Larry Yackle, AEDPA Mea Culpa, 24 FED. SENT’G REP. 329, 330 (2012); Krista A. Dolan, 
The § 2254 Trinity: How the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Richter, Pinholster, and Greene Have 
Interpreted Federal Review into Near Nonexistence, 8 CRIM. L. BRIEF 49, 49–50 (2013). 
 32.   28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2012). 
 33.   See Stephen B. Bright, Is Fairness Irrelevant?: The Evisceration of Federal Habeas 
Corpus Review and Limits on the Ability of State Courts to Protect Fundamental Rights, 54 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1, 4 (1997) (discussing the passage of and restrictions in the AEDPA). 
 34.   See Marceau, supra note 22, at 93–97. 
 35.   See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2254(d); see also Noam Biale, Beyond a Reasonable 
Disagreement: Judging Habeas Corpus, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2015) (“Over the last 
fifteen years, the Supreme Court has interpreted AEDPA to make ‘the Great Writ’ harder and harder 
to obtain, despite the fact that habeas petitions remain the primary vehicle for establishing claims of 
actual innocence, prosecutorial misconduct, and other issues with serious implications for justice.”). 
 36.   See Yackle, supra note 31, at 329 (discussing how quickly the bill was drafted and 
submitted for a vote without much negotiation). 
 37.   See Marceau, supra note 22, at 93–94; see also Larry Yackle, A Primer on the New 
Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 382 (1996) (“But then I mean to focus primary 
attention on the provision that has drawn the lion’s share of attention, both in Congress and in 
professional and academic circles.  Previously, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) governed the effect the federal 
habeas courts must give to state court findings of historical fact. Pub. L. 104-132 has now 
reconfigured that section to prescribe the effect the federal courts must give to prior state court 
judgments on the merits of federal claims[.]”). 
 38.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2012) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a 
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any 
claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the 
claim – (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, 
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) 
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the 
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”). 
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rather than on the lawfulness of a prisoner’s custody, the traditional 
concern of habeas corpus.”39  Even if a federal judge found a state court 
decision incorrectly applied federal law, deference to that erroneous 
decision would still have to apply unless it was unreasonable. 
Defining “unreasonable” has become a growing concern for federal 
courts in applying § 2254(d)(1).  As the key provision, the meaning of 
the term has evolved into a nearly impenetrable wall few state prisoners 
can surmount.40  Beginning in Williams v. Taylor, the Supreme Court 
took its first foray into interpreting what an “unreasonable application” 
was in relation to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.41  
Specifically, the Court laid out the groundwork that deference to state 
court decisions should apply as: 
[Those] that do not “conflict” with federal law will rarely be 
“unreasonable” under either [Justice O’Connor’s] reading of the statute 
or ours.  We all agree that state-court judgments must be upheld unless, 
after the closest examination of the state-court judgment, a federal court 
is firmly convinced that a federal constitutional right has been 
violated.42 
The deference standard is said to not be an absolute bar for federal 
courts considering state merit decisions.43  Instead, while preference must 
be given, federal courts must ascertain whether either the law or the facts 
were unreasonably evaluated. 
                                                          
 39.   Lynn Adelman, Federal Habeas Review of State Court Convictions: Incoherent Law but 
an Essential Right, 64 ME. L. REV. 379, 380, 384 (2012) (“Federal court review of state court 
convictions serves several important functions.  First, when state courts address the merits of a 
federal constitutional claim, federal courts must determine whether they did so correctly.  Second, 
when state courts do not address the merits of a federal constitutional claim, federal courts must 
ensure that they have a sufficient reason for not doing so.  Thus, just as federal law is supreme, so is 
federal adjudication of that law as mandated by Congress.”); see also Alan Chen, Shadow Law: 
Reasonable Unreasonableness, Habeas Theory, and the Nature of Legal Rules, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 535, 539 (1999) (“[F]ederal courts offer only the appearance of law, disregarding the reality 
that law enforcement officials may violate personal constitutional rights of criminal suspects and that 
state court judges may sometimes under-enforce federal constitutional rights in the often 
emotionally-charged context of criminal law.”). 
 40.   See Marceau, supra note 22, at 109–10 (“Presently, however, the Court’s aggressive 
interpretation of § 2254(d)(1) serves to ensure that most state prisoners are not eligible for relief 
despite the fact that their convictions rest on unconstitutional procedures—that is to say, ‘an 
unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’”). 
 41.   529 U.S. 362, 409 (2000). 
 42.   Id. at 389. 
 43.   See id. at 385. 
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1. The Supreme Court restricts factual development even further. 
In Harrington v. Richter and Cullen v. Pinholster, the Supreme Court 
expanded the deference given to state court rulings.  In Richter, the Court 
held that a state court’s summary denial of a constitutional claim was 
presumed to be a merits determination when considered in federal habeas 
corpus analysis.44  If an inmate seeks to rebut this presumption, “a state 
prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling on the claim being 
presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an 
error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any 
possibility for fairminded disagreement.”45  This shift in emphasis 
stripped away any pretense of examining whether the state courts either 
on direct appeal or post-conviction applied federal constitutional law 
correctly as habeas corpus historically required.46  Instead, form took 
precedence over substance in deciding whether a conviction was valid.  
An inmate was now tasked with foreseeing any potential reason for the 
state court’s summary denial and refuting it in order to satisfy the 
deference standard. 
Pinholster narrowed the interpretation of the deference provisions 
even further.  Once again evaluating a constitutional claim for ineffective 
assistance of counsel, the Court discussed the scope of the record that 
should be considered when § 2254(d)(1) applied.47  The opinion limited a 
federal court’s deferential review to the record before the state court at 
the time of state court’s decision.48  Such a restriction greatly 
undermined several of the other provisions of the AEDPA, including 
granting discovery, an evidentiary hearing, or both in ascertaining the 
validity of the constitutional claim.49  Additionally, the Court limited 
                                                          
 44.   Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 
 45.   Id. at 103; see also Biale, supra note 35, at 1349; Huq, supra note 16, at 541 (“Finally, the 
petitioner would have to show a valid claim on the merits notwithstanding habeas’s nonretroactivity 
and harmless error rules.  In many instances, moreover, the state-court ruling will be summary in 
nature, containing no legal reasoning.  In such instances, the petitioner will have to imagine all 
possible grounds of decision the state court might have conjured—and refute all of them.  Add to 
this the fact that the petitioner most likely lacks counsel both in the state postconviction context and 
the federal habeas context.  It is hardly surprising that habeas relief rates in this context are 
vanishingly small.”). 
 46.   See Huq, supra note 16, at 538; see also Dolan, supra note 31, at 53.  Without an opinion, 
it is virtually impossible for an inmate to show his state court ruling was unreasonable.  Additionally, 
it forecloses the opportunity for an argument to review the case under § 2254(d)(2) as there is no 
factual discussion in a summary dismissal. 
 47.   Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181–82 (2011). 
 48.   Id. at 181. 
 49.   See id. at 210 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Murphy, supra note 19, at 726–27. 
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what a federal court could consider as to whether the state court decision 
was unreasonable.50 
An unanswered question from the Pinholster decision focuses on 
what happens when an inmate’s ability to properly build the record in 
state proceedings is impeded through an external factor.51  One example 
involves official misconduct claims that are difficult to factually develop 
in state appellate and collateral proceedings for a variety of reasons 
discussed below.  Often, it is only through federal habeas corpus fact 
development efforts like discovery and evidentiary hearings that the 
merits of such claims can be fully conceptualized.  Prior to Pinholster, an 
inmate could challenge whether state court merits ruling is worthy of 
deference with these statutory tools.  The Court’s limitation curtails an 
inmate’s ability to demonstrate the lack of full and fair process under § 
2254(d)(1).  In other words, a cursory state review may protect official 
misconduct by state actors by trumping a federal court’s power to 
substantively address that claim.  As both cases originated in California, 
where systematic official misconduct has come to light, they illustrate 
the devastating impact these cases have on constitutional protections.  As 
described below, the systemic use of jailhouse informants in Orange 
County, California violated numerous inmates’ constitutional rights by 
impacting their potential ability to prove their innocence, impeach 
witnesses, or present a meaningful defense.52 
What a California inmate, who is often acting pro se, faces is an 
inability to fully explain how a jailhouse informant lied or was placed in 
his cell by the police or prosecution.  Due to his lack of counsel in post-
conviction, he does not understand a complex state appellate process, and 
lacks the funds or assistance for further factual development.53  Upon 
entering federal habeas, his opportunity to present additional evidence 
substantiating the extent of the police and prosecution’s interference with 
a fair trial is blocked.  This inmate’s case is reviewed under whatever 
limited record the state court developed.  The mandated restriction of the 
record under review rewards improper behavior by police and 
                                                          
 50.   See Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 188, 203; see also Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 (citing Yarborough 
v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)) (discussing that an unreasonableness determination is only 
appropriate if “fairminded jurists could disagree” regarding the state court decision); Judith L. Ritter, 
The Voice of Reason—Why Recent Judicial Interpretations of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act’s Restrictions on Habeas Corpus Are Wrong,  37 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 55, 69–70 (2013). 
 51.   Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 212, 212 n.4 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 52.   See infra notes 154–55 and accompanying text. 
 53.   See Huq, supra note 16, at 521 (discussing the pervasive problem of state courts in failing 
to provide effective defense counsel who would often spot these claims). 
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prosecutors despite the state process providing cursory factual 
development and limited review. 
2. The provision often lost in the discussion: Section 2254(d)(2). 
Treated almost as an afterthought, § 2254(d)(2) applies in situations 
where the factual judgments of the state court offend federal precedent.  
Specifically, the provision requires that: 
[a]n application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in 
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State 
court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim . . . resulted in a 
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts 
in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.54 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of (d)(2) requires a federal court 
to determine the reasonableness of the entirety of the evidence presented 
in state court.55  Lower federal courts must consider the totality of the 
state court record and whether the inmate was prevented from presenting 
evidence when determining if the state court’s decision was objectively 
unreasonable in light of the constitutional claims precedent on the 
matter.56 
Unlike the preceding subsection, § 2254(d)(2) receives much less 
discussion in case law.57  It is often interwoven into discussions of 
whether a federal evidentiary hearing should be granted under § 
2254(e)(1).58  Yet most courts apply § 2254(d)(1) without considering 
                                                          
 54.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2012). 
 55.   See Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003) (“[A] decision adjudicated on the 
merits in a state court and based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds 
unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state-court proceeding.”). 
 56.   See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE § 7.1 (7th ed. 2016) (discussing the effect the lack of a full and fair state procedure may 
have on the federal court’s treatment of constitutional claims).  Given the Supreme Court’s holding 
in Pinholster and Richter, § 2254(d)(2) may be the safety valve for inmates challenging the 
deficiencies of the state court criminal appellate process. 
 57.   See Marceau, supra note 22, at 94 n.23 (noting “the Court has made no effort to elaborate 
on the scope and function of the (d)(2) escape hatch”). 
 58.   See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 235–36 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[T]he relationship 
between the standards enunciated in § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1) remains unclear . . . . Courts have 
tended to lump the two provisions together as generally indicative of the deference AEDPA requires 
of state court factual determinations.” (citations omitted)).  See also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) (2012) 
(“In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody 
pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court 
shall be presumed to be correct.  The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of 
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.”). 
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whether the factual basis of the constitutional claim would be more 
appropriate under § 2254 (d)(2).  Under this provision, an inmate could 
challenge his ability to develop facts in state court proceedings.59  
Factual determinations are vital for constitutional claims because they 
provide the crux of the claim and the basis for relief.  Without a clear 
explanation as to how and why the police or prosecutors acted 
inappropriately, there is no means for any substantive assessment of the 
extensiveness of the violation.60  A state’s structural flaws may provide 
an inmate the ability to obtain an evidentiary hearing and remove the 
deference owed a state court ruling since such avenues are all but closed 
under § 2254(d)(1).61  This provision provides a key opportunity for an 
inmate to articulate the obstructions in discovery, investigation, or other 
assistance in state direct appeal or collateral proceedings that led to 
faulty factual findings by the state court.62  The Supreme Court in two 
                                                          
 59.   See Stephanie Roberts Hartung, Habeas Corpus for the Innocent, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 1, 33 (2016); see also Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2004); 2 HERTZ & 
LIEBMAN, supra note 56, § 32.4, at 1995–98  (explaining the factors federal courts may use in 
evaluating reasonableness under § 2254(d)(2), including: “(1) The state court failed to make a 
factual determination that should have been made; (2) Although the state court made a factual 
determination, that determination was procedurally unreasonable because, for example: (a) The state 
court made an evidentiary finding without holding a hearing; (b) Although the state court held a 
hearing, that hearing was not ‘full and fair’; (c) The state court misconstrued or misstated the record 
or overlooked or misconstrued evidence; (d) The state court applied an erroneous legal standard in 
making the factual determination; (3) Although the state court made a factual determination and 
employed an adequate procedure in making that determination, the resulting determination is 
substantively unreasonable because it is not fairly supported by the ‘evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.’”). 
 60.   See Marceau, supra note 22, at 117 (noting that “[f]acts are the critical foundation upon 
which a claim of constitutional defect can rise to the level of ‘unreasonableness’ as required for 
federal intervention under § 2254(d)”). 
 61.   See Maddox, 366 F.3d at 999 (“The first provision—the ‘unreasonable determination’ 
clause—applies most readily to situations where petitioner challenges the state court’s findings 
based entirely on the state record.  Such a challenge may be based on the claim that the finding is 
unsupported by sufficient evidence, that the process employed by the state court is defective, or that 
no finding was made by the state court at all.  What the ‘unreasonable determination’ clause teaches 
us is that, in conducting this kind of intrinsic review of a state court’s processes, we must be 
particularly deferential to our state-court colleagues.  For example, in concluding that a state-court 
finding is unsupported by substantial evidence in the state-court record, it is not enough that we 
would reverse in similar circumstances if this were an appeal from a district court decision.  Rather, 
we must be convinced that an appellate panel, applying the normal standards of appellate review, 
could not reasonably conclude that the finding is supported by the record.  Similarly, before we can 
determine that the state-court factfinding process is defective in some material way, or perhaps non-
existent, we must more than merely doubt whether the process operated properly.  Rather, we must 
be satisfied that any appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be unreasonable in 
holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was adequate.”) (citations omitted). 
 62.   See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 56, § 7.1(b), at 395–96 (“Accordingly, if available 
state postconviction remedies on their face or as applied offer an ‘[in]adequate corrective process for 
the hearing and determination of claims of violation of federal constitutional guarantees,’ it is 
counsel’s obligation to argue the point in state postconviction proceedings at the trial level or 
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key cases, Wiggins v. Smith63 and Miller-El v. Cockrell,64 conducted an 
in-depth analysis of the state court factual findings.  In both cases, the 
Court found state court rulings to be objectively unreasonable based on 
the entirety of the state court record.  In granting relief in both cases, the 
Court’s evaluation of the factual evidence presented during the state 
court proceedings demonstrated the unreasonableness in those 
proceedings in evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel and racially 
improper peremptory challenges, respectively.65  The Court determined a 
level of deference usually applied under § 2254(d)(1) was not the same 
as under a factual evaluation.66  While a deferential evaluation still 
applies, the ability to assess the state factual determinations permits 
broader evaluation than the strictures of § 2254(d)(1). 
B. What’s wrong with deference? 
Numerous federal judges and scholars have written about the 
problems with the AEDPA’s deference standard.  A main criticism is its 
inability to fix the state court’s failure to abide by federal law when 
interpreting constitutional violations.  Included in this discussion is the 
lack of proper factual development as intended by the AEDPA.  Another 
concern is the inability of federal courts to ensure that state courts 
correctly apply federal law when deference applies.  The Supremacy 
Clause necessitates that state court rulings that misapply federal law 
should be overturned.  However, the deference standard prohibits federal 
courts from correcting an improper state court ruling unless it is 
unreasonable to the extent that fairminded jurists would disagree.  The 
interplay of these two provisions demonstrate why § 2254(d) improperly 
undermines the original intent of the Great Writ. 
1. The State Court Inability to Apply Federal Law Correctly 
The AEDPA provided two key provisions to allow state courts the 
first opportunity to correct any constitutional defects in an inmate’s 
conviction.  First, before an inmate may file her federal habeas corpus 
                                                          
whenever inadequacies in the process become apparent and in all subsequent state court appeals.” 
(alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
 63.   539 U.S. 510, 534–38 (2003) (considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim for 
the penalty phase of a capital trial). 
 64.   537 U.S. 322, 322 (2003) (reviewing a Batson claim of juror strikes based on race). 
 65.   Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 535; Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 347–48. 
 66.   See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 528–29; see also Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 357–59, 357 n.2. 
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petition, she must have submitted the constitutional claim to the state 
court in either direct appeal or post-conviction to exhaust it.67  
Exhaustion is required for all constitutional claims unless an inmate 
demonstrates that the state system does not provide a means for 
substantive review.68  The vast majority of states provide some type of 
mechanism for such review.69  Federal habeas jurisprudence emphasizes 
the need to exhaust all claims before presenting them in federal court as a 
show of respect or comity, thus allowing the state the first opportunity to 
fix any constitutional errors.70  However, whether those procedures work 
is another matter. 
Second, the AEPDA restricted access to an evidentiary hearing if one 
had been sought or should have been requested in state collateral 
proceedings. An inmate must demonstrate his diligence in pursuing 
factual development in state proceedings.71  Without proof of asking for 
but being denied the opportunity to present the evidence at a hearing, an 
inmate will be precluded in federal court.72  Given Pinholster’s 
restriction of federal review to state proceedings, the AEPDA strengthens 
the mandate for factual development to occur in the state courts.73 
The federal habeas jurisprudence’s impetus to defer to state rulings is 
built on the premise that the state will provide an inmate the ability to 
develop the factual basis in his constitutional claims and substantively 
address any faults with his state court convictions.74  Therefore, 
restricting federal habeas corpus under that framework makes sense.  
However, in practice, that is not what occurs.  Inmates, who are 
predominately acting pro se throughout state and federal proceedings, are 
unable to get the discovery or factual development from state courts.  As 
discussed below, state courts through design and practice are ill-equipped 
to handle constitutional claims in accordance with federal law. 
                                                          
 67.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2) (2012). 
 68.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B); see also Murphy, supra note 19, at 723. 
 69.   See 1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 56, § 3.5(a)(6), at 224 (noting that “[a]ll States 
provide some form of postconviction review”). 
 70.   See Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–78 (1971) (noting exhaustion requires that “the 
substance of a federal habeas corpus claim must first be presented to the state courts” and the claim 
may be the same “despite variations in the legal theory or factual allegations urged” in support of the 
claim); see also Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 520–22 (1982), superseded by statute, Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; Wainwright v. Skyes, 
433 U.S. 72, 80 (1977). 
 71.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). 
 72.   Id. 
 73.   See supra notes 47–50 and accompanying text discussing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 
170, 181–82 (2011). 
 74.   See Marceau, supra note 22, at 118–19. 
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a. State structural problems 
One of the main difficulties facing inmates raising various 
constitutional challenges to their conviction is the lack of representation.  
While there has been a plethora of research and commentary on the 
deficiencies of trial counsel, these problems are exacerbated in direct 
appeal, and state collateral proceedings.75  The Sixth Amendment 
mandates effective assistance of counsel from the trial phase through the 
first appeal, called direct appeal.76  However, the right to counsel ends 
afterwards.  There is no right to counsel in state post-conviction and 
federal habeas corpus.77  Even if a state court provides counsel in 
collateral appeals, there is no remedy if the attorney is ineffective.  For 
that reason, many states court rules do not provide counsel after the first 
appeal.78 
Without counsel, inmates must investigate, locate documents and 
physical evidence, and draft pleadings from their jail cells.79  Further, 
they are expected to abide by complicated state rules regarding the form 
and substance of their pleadings.80  When an inmate raises a Brady claim 
or some other challenge considered as official misconduct, he may have 
some evidence gleaned from state open records provisions or located 
from other investigation.  However, this inmate is dependent on the state 
system to provide the means and opportunity to develop his claim.  Also, 
he must do so at the first opportunity to preserve the claim in federal 
habeas corpus, but more importantly, to gain relief on the valid 
constitutional violation.81 
Another problem plaguing state court adjudications is state court 
judges who are disinclined to properly vet constitutional claims.82  Often, 
                                                          
 75.   See Daniel Givelber, The Right to Counsel in Collateral, Post-Conviction Proceedings, 58 
MD. L. REV. 1393, 1395 (1999). 
 76.   Id. at 1393. 
 77.   Id. 
 78.   See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2012); Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911, 1917–18 (2013); 
Bright, supra note 33, at 8; see also Eve Brensike Primus, A Crisis in Federal Habeas Law, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 887, 900 (2012) (book review). 
 79.   See Tiffany R. Murphy, “But I Still Haven’t Found What I’m Looking For”: The Supreme 
Court’s Struggle Understanding Factual Investigations in Federal Habeas Corpus, 18 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 1129, 1163–64 (2016). 
 80.   See Dolan, supra note 31, at 50–51. 
 81.   See generally Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 
U.S. 838, 845 (1999) (discussing the importance of constitutional claims in federal habeas corpus 
and why they must be litigated properly through state collateral proceedings before entering federal 
habeas corpus). 
 82.   Adelman, supra note 39, at 388–89 (“For other reasons too, state courts are not well 
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a state process designates the trial court judge who either took the plea or 
presided over the trial to also handle the collateral process.83  There is 
often not an automatic appointment of an independent adjudicator for 
these hearings due to the need for judicial economy.84  Such judges may 
have a cognitive bias against an inmate asserting claims of police and 
prosecutorial misconduct given their preconceived notions about the 
case.85  Further, many state court judges are often former prosecutors 
who are disinclined to find fault against their colleagues.86  “Indeed, 
studies suggest that state habeas proceedings fail to adequately remedy 
constitutional errors occurring at the trial level.”87  “For example, a 
Texas study concluded that state post-conviction decisions were 
primarily copied verbatim from government briefs in 83.7% of state 
habeas cases.”88  Such failure to properly substantively review 
constitutional claims deprives inmates of the full and fair consideration 
the Great Writ intended. 
                                                          
positioned to decide the constitutional claims of state prisoners.  State court judges receive less 
training in federal constitutional law than their federal counterparts and face federal constitutional 
issues less often.  Federal judges receive a great deal of education about such issues both when they 
take the bench and on an ongoing basis.  For example, they regularly attend workshops about the 
past term’s Supreme Court decisions.  They also have two to four law clerks who are usually among 
the brightest members of their law school classes.  State court judges receive less training, have less 
staff, and often have to face long daily calendars.”). 
 83.   See Tran v. Lockhart, 849 F.2d 1064, 1067–69 (8th Cir. 1988); Armstead v. Scott, 37 F.3d 
202, 207–08 (5th Cir. 1994). 
 84.   See generally  1 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 56, § 3.5(a)(6), at 224 (“In many States, a 
petition for postconviction relief is filed in a trial-level state court, where an evidentiary hearing may 
be held  on any claims that  require factfinding.”); Rachel G. Cohen & Krista A. Dolan, Drowned out 
without Discovery: Post-Conviction Procedural Inadequacy in an Era of Habeas Deference, 1 
CRIM. L. PRAC. 5 (2013) (discussing how the trial judge handles discovery in state post-conviction 
proceedings); State v. Prince, 772 P.2d 1121, 1124 (Ariz. 1989). 
 85.   Mary Nicol Bowman, Mitigating Foul Blows, 49 GA. L. REV. 309, 318 (2015) (discussing 
how cognitive bias research illustrates the high incidents of prosecutorial misconduct and courts 
inability to properly address these constitutional claims). 
  86.   See Radley Balko, The Untouchables: America’s Misbehaving Prosecutors, and the 
System That Protects Them, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 1, 2013, 2:18 P.M.), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/08/01/prosecutorial-misconduct-new-orleans-
louisiana_n_3529891.html (discussing the difficulties facing the legal system in prosecuting 
prosecutorial misconduct). 
 87.   Hartung supra note 59; see also Jake Sussman, Unlimited Innocence: Recognizing an 
“Actual Innocence” Exception to AEDPA’s Statute of Limitations, 27 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 343, 366 n.104 (2001-2002) (listing empirical studies of states that affirmed convictions of 
actually innocent defendants). 
 88.   Hartung, supra note 59; see also Marceau, supra note 22, at 100–04 (discussing the 
decreasing number of state inmates obtaining relief after the AEDPA took effect: “But the grace 
period appears to be over.  The data reflected in Tables 1 and 2, although not conclusive, are usefully 
predictive of a downward trend in the rate of success for state prisoners in the Supreme Court, and it 
seems likely that as the rate of success in the Supreme Court diminishes, lower courts seeking to 
avoid reversal will also become more parsimonious with grants of relief to habeas petitioners.”). 
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Additionally, allowing state courts to rely on summary denials for 
either direct appeal or collateral rulings as a merits review undermines 
the state court comity argument.  As an inmate is entitled to full and fair 
process in state court, the lack of an opinion deprives both state and 
federal courts the power to review the constitutionality of these 
decisions.  There is no means by which an inmate, much less a federal 
judge, would be able to ascertain whether that ruling is “contrary to, or 
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, 
as determined by the Supreme Court.”89  California often summarily 
denies collateral cases without any opinion.90  While the Supreme Court 
ordered federal courts to give these summary denials deference,91 it 
unduly binds inmates with viable claims to any critical evaluation in 
federal habeas proceedings. 
Consider this hypothetical: an inmate raises a Fourteenth 
Amendment substantive due process claim because a prosecutor failed to 
disclose fingerprint reports establishing a third party’s, not the inmate’s, 
prints were on the murder weapon.  Such evidence is exculpatory to the 
inmate.  However, more factual development and legal argument may be 
necessary during state post-conviction to establish whether the withheld 
evidence was material.  Put another way, the inmate must show if the 
fingerprint evidence prejudiced him at trial potentially resulting in a 
lesser sentence or a not guilty finding.  If the state post-conviction court 
summarily denies the inmate’s petition and on appeal, the state supreme 
court follows suit, the inmate received no actual discussion of the merits 
of his constitutional claim for a federal court to assess. 
When the inmate arrives in federal habeas corpus proceedings, the 
federal district court must determine whether there was a reasonable 
basis for the state court’s decision.  Specifically, under Richter, the 
federal court must consider whether, “‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ 
on the correctness of the state court’s decision.”92  So long as the state 
court’s ruling had some legal basis, deference must be given regardless 
of whether the federal court disagrees or potentially believes the 
constitutional claim may have merit.93  Pinholster restricts the federal 
court even further by limiting its review to a non-existent state court 
                                                          
 89.   28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2012). 
 90.   Hartung, supra note 59, at 33–34 (“Yet given that many states, such as California, deny 
thousands of habeas petitions per year through summary dispositions, it is impossible to determine 
how often state courts determine the facts or interpret the law in an unreasonable manner.”). 
 91.   Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011). 
 92.   Id. at 101; see also Biale, supra note 35, at 1340. 
 93.   See Dolan, supra note 31, at 53. 
18 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
record.94  The inmate with the exculpatory fingerprint report faces 
additional obstacles in asking for either discovery or an evidentiary 
hearing to prove the viability of his Fourteenth Amendment claim.95 
A state court’s failure to apply federal court law in any meaningful 
fashion not only creates difficulty in applying the AEDPA as intended, 
but also undermines the Great Writ.  The original intent of the Writ was 
to have federal courts oversee state court processes and procedures as 
they interpret federal jurisprudence.  Now, federal courts must abdicate 
their power to state courts when considering whether federal law has 
been properly interpreted.  Such a shift is problematic because it 
infringes on the Supremacy Clause. 
b. Does Deference Infringe on the Supremacy Clause? 
The Supremacy Clause mandates that all federal courts review state 
court decisions to ensure that states, “treat federal law as the ‘Supreme 
Law of the Land’” and overturn any state law that acts contrary to it.96  
The fundamental role of federal courts is to ensure the proper 
interpretation of federal law and precedent.  The Great Writ, as originally 
intended, coincided with this principle by ensuring state convictions did 
not violate the Constitution related to either guilt or sentencing.97  This 
framework ensured that federal courts could review state court decisions 
properly and in accordance with federal law.  The deference provision 
undermines the Supremacy Clause because it forces federal courts to 
uphold convictions with constitutional violations that may conflict with 
existing Supreme Court precedent. Specifically, as federal courts assess 
the substantive decisions by state courts—who are supposed to correctly 
interpret federal law—federal courts are no longer able to overturn state 
court errors on the merits.98  Instead, federal courts are impotent to 
                                                          
 94.   See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text discussing Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 
170, 181–82 (2011). 
 95.   See generally Marceau, supra note 22, at 113 (“The Brady right may be heroic in form, but 
the modern interpretations of AEDPA make Brady meek in function.  The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that there was little doubt ‘Valdovinos’s Brady rights were violated’ but nonetheless held that, 
because federal review is constrained by § 2254(d), the petitioner was not ‘entitled to habeas relief.’  
The point is, even as to the most sacrosanct of the constitutional criminal procedure rights, under 
AEDPA, the duty of constitutional enforcement is largely delegated to the state courts.”). 
 96.   2 HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 56, § 32.5, at 2009 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2). 
 97.   See Bright, supra note 34. 
 98.   See Chen, supra note 39, at 541 (“[I]f this interpretation prevails, § 2254(d)(1) raises 
serious constitutional questions about Congress’s authority to establish federal jurisdiction over 
federal habeas claims while simultaneously limiting the legal standard of review those courts may 
exercise in examining whether a prisoner is being held in violation of the Constitution.”). 
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address these incorrect applications of federal law. Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals Chief Judge Alex Kozinski speaks to the conflict in abiding by 
the deference provisions in cases where the state courts misapplied 
federal law: 
We now regularly have to stand by in impotent silence, even though it 
may appear to us that an innocent person has been convicted.  Not even 
the Supreme Court may act on what it believes is a constitutional 
violation if the issue is raised in a habeas petition as opposed to on 
direct appeal.  There are countless examples of this, but perhaps the 
best illustration is Cavazos v. Smith, the case involving a grandmother 
who had spent 10 years in prison for the alleged shaking death of her 
infant grandson—a conviction secured by since-discredited junk 
science.  My court freed Smith, but the Supreme Court summarily 
reversed (over Justice Ginsburg’s impassioned dissent) based on 
AEDPA. 
AEDPA is a cruel, unjust and unnecessary law that effectively removes 
federal judges as safeguards against miscarriages of justice.  It has 
resulted and continues to result in much human suffering.  It should be 
repealed.99 
Cavazos v. Smith is a prime example of form over substance as the 
Ninth Circuit considered the state court’s application of Jackson v. 
Virginia concerning the sufficiency of the evidence necessary for a 
criminal conviction.100  The state court convicted and affirmed Smith’s 
case based solely on flawed forensic science rulings.101  Shirley Smith, 
grandmother of the 7-week-old victim, was convicted under the 
prosecution’s theory of Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS) and sentenced to 
fifteen years to life imprisonment.102  The California state courts denied 
relief after finding that there was sufficient evidence to support the 
conviction.103 
When Smith filed her federal habeas corpus petition, she renewed 
her constitutional challenge to her conviction based on the insufficiency 
of the evidence.104  Specifically, she argued that the evidence presented 
                                                          
 99.   Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. iii, xli–xlii (2015) 
(footnotes omitted). 
 100.   Cavazos v. Smith, 565 U.S. 1, 6–7 (2011); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 326 
(1979). 
 101.   See Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 6. 
 102.   Id. at 5–6. 
 103.   Id. 
 104.   Id. 
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could not establish that the victim died from SBS.105  The federal 
magistrate agreed that there were serious issues with the California state 
rulings, that “‘[t]his is not the typical shaken baby case[,]’ and that the 
evidence against Smith ‘raises many questions.’”106  However, both the 
magistrate and district court judge found that the evidence was sufficient 
to support the conviction acknowledging the deference owed the state 
court decision.107 
The Ninth Circuit overturned the district court’s opinion on the 
grounds that the state courts failed to properly apply Jackson v. Virginia, 
standard for sufficiency of the evidence.108  The Circuit Court discussed 
the deference owed to the state court ruling but found California 
Supreme Court’s ruling an unreasonable application of federal 
precedent.109  The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Circuit on its 
failure to abide by the high deference standard of the AEDPA without 
any discussion of the flawed scientific evidence used by the 
prosecution.110  In other words, the federal district court, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, and three Supreme Court Justices expressed 
grave concerns as to whether the state’s evidence against a grandmother 
was sufficient beyond a reasonable doubt to support her potential life 
sentence.  Yet the Court’s majority holding reinforces that federal courts 
may not second-guess state courts’ decisions despite their questionable 
application of federal law.111  Smith’s case is not an anomaly.  Instead, it 
is the norm for inmates with strong constitutional challenges to their 
convictions struggling against cursory review in state proceedings. 
The deference standard usurps the ability of federal courts to ensure 
the proper interpretation of federal laws by state courts.  Federal courts 
may only overturn a state court’s merit decision when it is unreasonable, 
not when it misapplies federal law.  This distinction unconstitutionally 
restricts federal courts from conducting the review intended by the 
habeas statute.  As Cavazos v. Smith illustrates, when a prosecution rests 
                                                          
 105.   Id. 
 106.   Id. at 6. 
 107.   See id. 
 108.   See id. at 6–7 (citing Smith v. Mitchell, 437 F.3d 884, 890 (9th Cir. 2006)). 
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Cavazos, 565 U.S. at 9. 
 111.   See id. at 8 (“In light of the evidence presented at trial, the Ninth Circuit plainly erred in 
concluding that the jury’s verdict was irrational, let alone that it was unreasonable for the California 
Court of Appeal to think otherwise.  Doubts about whether Smith is in fact guilty are understandable.  
But it is not the job of this Court, and was not that of the Ninth Circuit, to decide whether the State’s 
theory was correct.  The jury decided that question, and its decision is supported by the record.” 
(citations omitted)). 
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on dubious evidence to convict someone, and state courts conduct a 
cursory review, federal courts are now impotent to correct it.  In these 
cases, it is imperative that federal courts, at all levels, evaluate whether 
the factual grounds raised support granting the writ. 
III. OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT: SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS 
UNDER THE DEFERENCE STANDARD. 
Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process claims raised in 
federal habeas corpus primarily deal with either police or prosecutorial 
misconduct.  These claims usually involve problems with interrogations, 
discovery disclosures, and improper argument by state actors.  Such 
violations often require significant investigation or fact development to 
satisfy various constitutional elements warranting relief.  Because an 
inmate is challenging state actors, state courts give the benefit of the 
doubt to state officials.112  Therefore, such claims are harder to prove 
than other constitutional challenges in state proceedings.  Federal habeas 
proceedings have been a haven for these issues. 
A. What is Official Misconduct? 
The most common misconduct claim is the failure of the prosecution 
to disclose exculpatory or impeachment evidence under Brady v. 
Maryland.113  Brady and its progeny focus on the prosecutor’s 
independent obligation to locate and disclose evidence favorable to the 
accused prior to trial.114  A defendant is not required to request this 
information as a prerequisite for the prosecutor’s obligation.115  For an 
inmate to prove a Brady claim, he must first show that the prosecution 
had the evidence either in their possession or in law enforcement’s 
control.116  Second, the inmate must demonstrate that the evidence was 
not disclosed to the defense pretrial or during trial at the latest.117  
Finally, the inmate must show that the evidence is material, establishing 
a “reasonable probability” of a different result.118  Materiality requires an 
                                                          
 112.   See generally Bowman, supra note 85. 
 113.   373 U.S. 83, 89–91 (1963). 
 114.   See id at 87; see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432–41 (1995); United States v. 
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674–77 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153–55 (1972). 
 115.   See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976). 
 116.   See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421–22. 
 117.   See id. 
 118.   Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. 
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inmate to demonstrate actual prejudice from the failure to turn over 
evidence.  An inmate must explain how his case at trial would have been 
different had he possessed the withheld evidence.  A reviewing court 
must then evaluate the withheld evidence cumulatively as it weighs the 
evidence originally presented at trial.119 
Brady violations are often raised in habeas petitions but are the most 
difficult to factually prove.  An inmate or his counsel must have found 
the evidence that was not disclosed in the pretrial or trial proceedings.  
Further, an inmate must articulate how this evidence creates a reasonable 
probability of a different result.  It is on this third prong that most 
challenges fail.  Without additional discovery, either on direct appeal or 
state collateral proceedings, it is, first, hard to find proof—either in 
documents or physical evidence—that the police or prosecution failed to 
disclose.  Second, explaining how an inmate’s trial attorney would have 
changed strategy, impeached a witness, or called additional witnesses 
can be difficult for an inmate representing himself pro se.  When state 
processes summarily or cursory review such claims, the merits 
determination is suspect heading into federal habeas corpus proceedings.  
For these reasons, these claims are more likely to obtain relief under § 
2254(d) if viable, as will be discussed below.120 
Brady challenges are often brought in federal habeas corpus 
petitions.  Further, federal precedent is extensive in its application and 
granting of relief.  Therefore, federal courts are more comfortable 
handling these types of official misconduct claims.  However, such 
claims are just the tip of the iceberg of what can be considered official 
misconduct.  Federal courts are often unlikely to find state court rulings 
unreasonable for other forms of official misconduct.  Some of the typical 
challenges brought for police misconduct are based on Miranda v. 
Arizona121 for failing to provide notice of the right to remain silent or the 
right to counsel, or continuing an interrogation once a suspect asks for an 
attorney.  The veracity of confession may also be challenged, as seen in 
the Milke case.122 
Prosecutorial misconduct arises in as numerous circumstances as 
police misconduct.  Besides Brady violations, there can be numerous 
                                                          
 119.   Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436–37. 
 120.   See infra Section III.B. 
 121.   384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 122.   See Milke v. Schriro, CV-98-0060-PHX-RCB, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86708, at *13 (D. 
Ariz. Nov. 27, 2006) (claiming interrogation tactics violated Milke’s Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and 
Fourteenth Amendment rights), rev’d sub nom. Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2013). 
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Fourteenth Amendment claims, including improper argument,123 failure 
to correct knowingly false testimony,124 and voir dire claims,125 among 
others.126  Given the close relationship between police and prosecutors, 
there is often overlap in the factual bases of these types of constitutional 
claims.  Like Brady violations, it is often difficult for an inmate to 
substantiate his official misconduct claim because of the power 
differential between himself and the state actors involved.  Police and 
prosecutors determine whether to arrest, charge, prosecute, and what 
evidence—in terms of witnesses and exhibits—will be used against a 
defendant.  This power differential makes it hard for an inmate to 
successfully assert his constitutional violations the further along in the 
appellate process the case proceeds. 
B. Official Misconduct’s Treatment under the AEDPA’s Deference 
Standard. 
Prior to Richter and Pinholster, federal courts carved out an 
exception under the deference standard for Brady claims involving 
official misconduct in two instances: first, when the evidence was first 
uncovered in federal habeas, and second, if the evidence was partially 
uncovered in state collateral proceedings and the remainder was 
uncovered in federal proceedings.  The Brady precedent and its progeny 
span back to the 1950s and put state courts on notice of what is expected 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Additionally, the state court process 
may be critiqued by federal courts more freely when the claim warrants 
relief.  This section discusses how various federal courts have dealt with 
this area of official misconduct and why it should be expanded to 
encompass other improper actions. 
                                                          
 123.   See generally Ryan Patrick Alford, Catalyzing More Adequate Federal Habeas Review of 
Summation Misconduct: Persuasion Theory and the Sixth Amendment Right to an Unbiased Jury, 59 
OKLA. L. REV. 479 (2006) (evaluating the effect on the criminal justice system and federal habeas 
corpus when prosecutors’ improper comments during opening statement and closing argument 
deprive someone of a right to a fair trial). 
 124.   See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959) (finding unconstitutional a prosecutor 
failing to correct knowingly false testimony from witness regarding prosecutor’s promise of 
consideration). 
 125.   See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88 (1986) (finding unconstitutional a 
prosecutor using peremptory challenges to strike jurors based on race). 
 126.   See Kelly Puente & Tony Saavedra, In Rare Move, Judge Kicks Orange County D.A. off 
Case of Seal Beach Mass Shooting Killer Scott Dekraai, ORANGE COUNTY REG. (Mar. 13, 2015, 
12:55 PM), http://www.ocregister.com/2015/03/13/in-rare-move-judge-kicks-orange-county-da-off-
case-of-seal-beach-mass-shooting-killer-scott-dekraai/ (discussing the Orange County District 
Attorney Office’s use of jailhouse informants against defendants). 
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1. Evidence uncovered during federal habeas corpus proceedings. 
Familiarity with Brady claims made it easier for both inmates and 
federal courts to explain the withheld evidence and its impact on the 
entirety of a case.  Before Pinholster, habeas courts were comfortable 
with granting discovery and evidentiary hearings where inmates 
explained lapses in the state court system impairing their ability to 
present evidence.127  Several circuit courts of appeal found a de facto 
unreasonable application of federal law when additional evidence 
corroborated these substantive due process claims.128  Such additional 
evidence did not automatically result in a writ being granted in these 
cases but merely the opportunity for the inmate to obtain the evidence 
that should have been given in state proceedings.129  When courts did 
find that additional habeas evidence negated the deference review, these 
courts conducted a de novo review of the claim.130 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals applied this principle in a few 
cases.  In Monroe v. Angelone, the federal district court granted both 
discovery and an evidentiary hearing where Monroe developed 
additional evidence on her Brady claim.131  Monroe amended her habeas 
petition to include new facts showing police notes containing 
exculpatory evidence.132  The Court held that where new evidence was 
developed in federal habeas proceedings, deference did not apply and the 
Court should review the claim de novo.133  This reasoning focused on the 
                                                          
 127.   See Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 297–98 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Rojem v. Gibson, 
245 F.3d 1130, 1140 (10th Cir. 2001)) (“Pursuant to this doctrine, AEDPA’s deference requirement 
does not apply when a claim made on federal habeas review is premised on Brady material that has 
surfaced for the first time during federal proceedings.”); see also Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 
1206–07 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that AEDPA’s standard of review does not apply when new 
issues are considered on federal habeas review); Daniels v. Lee, 316 F.3d 477, 487 (4th Cir. 2003) 
(“[Because] the evidence on which [the federal claim] is premised was only discovered [after the 
conclusion of state court proceedings,] . . . [the claim] does not trigger the deference mandate of 
AEDPA.”); Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 2002) (“AEDPA deference does not 
apply to [a] claim [when] . . . [e]vidence of the [claim] . . . was adduced only at the hearing before 
the [federal] magistrate judge.”); Williams v. Coyle, 260 F.3d 684, 706 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Our review 
of [the] Brady claim will be under pre-AEDPA standards because no state court reviewed the merits 
of that claim.”). 
 128.   See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 297–98 (Fourth Circuit); Williams, 260 F.3d at 706 (Sixth 
Circuit); Killian, 282 F.3d at 1208 (Ninth Circuit); Cargle, 317 F.3d at 1206–07 (Tenth Circuit). 
 129.   See Monroe, 323 F.3d at 297–98; Cargle, 317 F.3d at 1206–07; Killian, 282 F.3d at 1208; 
Williams, 260 F.3d at 706. 
 130.   See, e.g., Monroe, 323 F.3d at 297–98. 
 131.   See id. at 296. 
 132.   See id. 
 133.   See id. at 297. 
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lack of a state court ruling to evaluate deferentially.134  Explained another 
way, because the state court did not rule on this evidence, or potentially 
provide means for its development, there was nothing for which a federal 
court must defer.  This rationale applied to a few cases where inmates 
were successful in obtaining a writ of habeas corpus.135  However, 
Pinholster ended this practice to provide inmates an avenue to fully 
develop claims that were improperly curtailed in state court.  Thus, valid 
claims of official misconduct go unrectified. 
2. Evidence uncovered late in state post-conviction or after state court. 
Even in situations where the evidence was uncovered completely in 
state post-conviction, the deference standard did not result in a 
guaranteed denial of relief.136  Instead, courts were comfortable with 
weighing the state court’s adjudication during either direct appeal or 
post-conviction, ensuring deference did not trump valid claims.137  After 
the Pinholster decision, what little ambiguity that lingered with 
deference was eliminated.  While federal courts grappled with the 
additional restrictions under Pinholster and later Richter, Justice 
Sotomayor discussed the potential for undue harm to inmates who 
possessed valid Fourteenth Amendment claims but were restricted in 
their ability to present the factual support through no fault of their 
own.138  Those inmates unable to prove their state court rulings either 
                                                          
 134.   See id. 
 135.   See Wolfe v. Clarke, 691 F.3d 410, 423–26 (4th Cir. 2012) (Monroe rationale used to 
support an actual innocence and Brady claim); Winston v. Pearson, 683 F.3d 489, 507 (4th Cir. 
2012) (granting relief where evidence of mental retardation was first presented in federal habeas 
corpus). 
 136.   See generally Jones v. Bagley, 696 F.3d 475 (6th Cir. 2012); Montgomery v. Bobby, 654 
F.3d 668 (6th Cir. 2011); Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 137.   See Harris v. Lafler, 553 F.3d 1028, 1033–35 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming grant of a 
conditional writ of habeas corpus where the prosecution withheld impeachment evidence affecting 
the credibility of a witness, despite the § 2254(d)(1) deference standard, because the state court 
failed to address the third element of Brady concerning materiality or actual prejudice); see also 
Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming denial of the writ of habeas 
corpus despite concluding that AEDPA’s deferential standard did not apply “[b]ecause the state 
court did not conduct the proper [Brady] analysis”). 
 138.   See Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 212–15 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).  Justice 
Sotomayor’s dissent illustrates a common problem facing inmates who had valid constitutional 
claims but were thwarted in their efforts to comply with state collateral procedures.  Because state 
post-conviction proceedings may not allow for discovery, it takes inmates much longer to find the 
factual predicate of their official misconduct claim.  As Justice Sotomayor explained: 
We have long recognized that some diligent habeas petitioners are unable to develop all 
of the facts supporting their claims in state court.  As discussed above, in enacting 
AEDPA, Congress generally barred evidentiary hearings for petitioners who did not 
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contained both procedural defaults and merits determination, thereby 
giving them an argument against § 2254(d)’s application, found 
themselves caught in a quagmire being unable to return to state court for 
relief and restricted from that evidence in federal habeas.  Many inmates 
found their claims unable to survive a deference review under such strict 
guidelines.139 
While federal habeas corpus jurisprudence lays out that state court 
decisions should either be on the merits or procedurally barred,140 state 
courts often conflate the two standards.  When state court opinions 
invoke both a procedural bar and merits decisions, federal courts could 
apply procedural bars which were now easier to bypass given the cause 
and prejudice exception paralleling application to the Brady elements.141  
                                                          
“exercise diligence in pursuing their claims” in state court.  Importantly, it did not impose 
any express limit on evidentiary hearings for petitioners who had been diligent in state 
court.  For those petitioners, Congress left the decision to hold a hearing “to the 
sound discretion of district courts.” 
. . . . 
Consider, for example, a petitioner who diligently attempted in state court to develop the 
factual basis of a claim that prosecutors withheld exculpatory witness statements in 
violation of Brady v. Maryland.  The state court denied relief on the ground that the 
withheld evidence then known did not rise to the level of materiality required under 
Brady.  Before the time for filing a federal habeas petition has expired, however, a state 
court orders the State to disclose additional documents the petitioner had timely requested 
under the State’s public records Act.  The disclosed documents reveal that the State 
withheld other exculpatory witness statements, but state law would not permit the 
petitioner to present the new evidence in a successive petition. 
Under our precedent, if the petitioner had not presented his Brady claim to the state court 
at all, his claim would be deemed defaulted, and the petitioner could attempt to show 
cause and prejudice to overcome the default.  If, however, the new evidence merely 
bolsters a Brady claim that was adjudicated on the merits in state court, it is unclear how 
the petitioner can obtain federal habeas relief after today’s holding.  What may have been 
a reasonable decision on the state-court record may no longer be reasonable in light of the 
new evidence.  Because the state court adjudicated the petitioner’s Brady claim on the 
merits, § 2254(d)(1) would still apply.  Yet, under the majority’s interpretation of § 
2254(d)(1), a federal court is now prohibited from considering the new evidence in 
determining the reasonableness of the state-court decision. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 139.   See, e.g., Runningeagle v. Ryan, 686 F.3d 758, 767 (9th Cir. 2012) (holding that the state 
court ruling on the Brady claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal 
law); Montgomery, 654 F.3d at 683 (overturning the federal district court writ of habeas corpus 
because the state court ruling was not unreasonable). 
 140.   See Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 485–86 (1986) (discussing a state procedural bar will 
be honored in federal habeas corpus if the bar is both adequate and independent), superseded by 
statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 
(codified as amended in scattered sections and titles). 
 141.   See id.; see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 282 (1999) (“Because petitioner 
acknowledges that his Brady claim is procedurally defaulted, we must first decide whether that 
default is excused by an adequate showing of cause and prejudice.  In this case, cause and prejudice 
parallel two of the three components of the alleged Brady violation itself.”). 
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For example, in Barton v. Warden, Southern Ohio Correctional Facility, 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals conducted a detailed discussion of the 
state court proceedings recognizing it was limited to the state court 
record.142  The Court explained that the “last state court to issue a 
reasoned opinion on the issue” in the case, provided a mixed ruling 
imposing procedural bar and a cursory merits examination.143  The Court 
applied the state procedural bar allowing a de novo review of Barton’s 
Brady claim that warranted relief.144 
Federal courts should look to § 2254(d)(2) for official misconduct 
claims, especially when there is a pattern of malfeasance.  Where all the 
evidence involving police or prosecutorial misconduct is clear from the 
state court record, the unreasonable application of the facts becomes 
much more apparent.  Such analysis would fit many of the broader types 
of official misconduct including improper arguments, Miranda 
violations, and false statements to a court.  The Milke opinion 
demonstrates a thorough analysis under both subsections of the deference 
standard in granting relief where a pattern of misconduct occurred. 
Very few federal courts conduct an analysis under both subsections 
of § 2254(d), as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did in the Milke case.  
Such analysis, even after the Supreme Court’s rulings in Richter and 
Pinholster, provided a means for valid claims to obtain relief.  An inmate 
receives a substantial benefit when a federal court considers the cause 
through both deferential lenses.  The Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the claim 
is quite distinct under both (d)(1) and (d)(2).  An examination of the 
analysis under (d)(2) involves an extensive examination of whether the 
state court failed to consider all the factual evidence in its record which 
would entitle Milke to relief: 
The prosecution’s suppression of this report in state court distorted the 
fact-finding process, forcing the state judge to make her finding based 
on an unconstitutionally incomplete record. . . . 
By withholding key evidence that it had a duty to produce, the 
prosecution induced a defect that causes us to “more than merely doubt 
whether the process operated properly.”  We can be certain it didn’t.  
“[A]ny appellate court to whom the defect is pointed out would be 
                                                          
 142.   See 786 F.3d 450, 460 (6th Cir. 2015). 
 143.   See id. at 461–62. 
 144.   See id.; see also, e.g., Gumm v. Mitchell, 775 F.3d 345, 362 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining 
that the state court discussed the merits of Gumm’s Brady claim, but the state court’s opinion stated 
it lacked jurisdiction on the claim.  Therefore, the claim was procedurally barred, allowing the 
federal courts to review it de novo if the elements of Brady were met). 
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unreasonable in holding that the state court’s fact-finding process was 
adequate.”  The state court’s finding thus amounted to an unreasonable 
determination of the facts under section 2254(d)(2).145 
Under this analysis, the Court is willing to give a presumption of 
correctness to factual determinations for (d)(2).  However, that 
presumption is overcome based upon a showing of the inadequacy of the 
evidence as demonstrated here.  As demonstrated, the Court found 
additional faults with the factual assessment conducted by the state 
court.146  Such in-depth discussion is vital in official misconduct cases 
because the facts and the withholding of the facts play such a critical role 
in the interpretation of deference and the underlying claim itself.  
Because of the immense power the police and prosecution have in 
criminal cases, their improper actions deprive inmates of the basis of 
their claims in a variety of contexts and provides narrow review if only 
examined under § 2254(d)(1).  When systemic official misconduct 
occurs, or, as in Milke, where one actor’s misconduct can be 
demonstrated across several cases, it is unreasonable for federal courts to 
uphold state court merits decisions that affirm these convictions.  Federal 
courts are in a better position to review such systemic misconduct 
because they are unencumbered by the limitations that affect state court 
decisions.  Reviewing official misconduct claims under  
§ 2254(d)(2) provides a greater protection of constitutional rights. 
IV. MOVING FORWARD 
Police and prosecutorial misconduct are garnering more attention by 
the media, state bars, and courts.  Such scrutiny focuses on the extensive 
power these actors have before charges are brought against an accused147 
or counsel is appointed.  As the criminal justice system entrusts 
prosecutors to seek justice first as they represent their constituents, their 
actions are now resulting in more accountability by the same.148  When 
                                                          
 145.   Milke v. Ryan, 711 F.3d 998, 1007 (9th Cir. 2013) (alteration in original) (citations 
omitted) (quoting Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). 
 146.   See id. at 1008–10. 
 147.   See, e.g., H. Mitchell Caldwell, The Prosecutor Prince: Misconduct, Accountability, and a 
Modest Proposal, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 51, 57–58 (2013) (outlining the powers of the prosecutor). 
 148.   See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (“The United States Attorney is the 
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to 
govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in 
a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done.”); see also 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-1.2(b) (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2015) (“The primary duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice within the bounds of the law, not 
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official actors abuse their power, federal courts should not be curtailed in 
their ability to ascertain the extent such abuse violated an inmate’s 
constitutional rights.  The prevailing concerns about federal habeas 
review, namely respecting state court rulings and preserving the finality 
of convictions, are not as persuasive in this context due to the 
malfeasance done by state police and prosecutors. 
A. Systemic Official Misconduct: Why the impact is greater. 
Official misconduct should not proceed under the deference standard 
due to the systemic impact it has on numerous defendants’ constitutional 
rights.  As previously discussed, prosecutors’ or police officers’ 
infractions are hard to rectify through a state trial and appellate process 
for numerous reasons.  Longstanding malfeasance by prosecutors’ 
offices impacts a variety of constitutional rights of those accused and 
convicted of crimes.  For inmates to receive objective and full review of 
their Fourteenth Amendment constitutional challenges during federal 
habeas requires a more lenient application of the deference standard.  
Specifically, federal courts should assess the factual record before them, 
considering how systemic misconduct impacts an inmate’s ability to 
fully present a claim in state court.  Included in this review is the 
question of whether the factual review performed by the state court 
would be unreasonable given the misconduct. 
Several prosecutors’ offices have been publicly reprimanded for their 
consistent misconduct.  A prime example is the Orleans Parrish District 
Attorney’s Office, which has a long history of prosecutorial misconduct.  
This includes three cases before the Supreme Court on egregious Brady 
violations.149  The Orleans Parrish DA’s Office under Harry Connick, Sr. 
and now Leon Cannizzaro abused its power by withholding exculpatory 
evidence, threatening witnesses, and making knowingly false statements 
to judges and juries.150  Such longstanding abuses existed in that office 
for over thirty years.151  However, these abuses are not only found in 
                                                          
merely to convict.”). 
 149.   See Wearry v. Cain, 136 S. Ct. 1002 (2016); Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73 (2012); Kyles v. 
Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995). 
 150.   See Wearry, 136 S. Ct. 1002, 1004–05 (prosecutors failing to disclose evidence); Smith, 
565 U.S. 73, 76 (same); Kyles, 514 U.S. 419, 441–42 (same); see also Bert, LA: In New Orleans, DA 
Cannizzaro Breaks the Bank and the Public’s Trust, THE OPEN FILE BLOG (Feb. 23, 2017), 
http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com/2017/02/23/la-in-new-orleans-da-cannizzaro-breaks-
the-bank-and-the-publics-trust/; see generally Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (describing 
abuses in the DA’s office under Connick, Sr.). 
 151.   See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 421 (noting that Orleans Parrish District Attorney Harry Connick, 
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New Orleans but are also pervasive through many prosecutor’s offices in 
the state.152  For the inmates impacted by prosecutorial overreaching, 
their relief predominately comes in federal habeas corpus proceedings.153 
The inability of the Louisiana state courts to address these clear 
federal constitutional violations illustrates the need for more federal 
court oversight rather than less.  Federal courts are aware of the New 
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office’s habitual failure to disclose 
evidence.  Therefore, when an individual raises a Brady violation, he 
should explain the extent to which discovery was provided pretrial and 
the police or prosecution’s response at trial.  Under § 2254(d)(2), the 
Court could examine the prosecution’s systemic misconduct in 
determining whether the state’s factual determination is reasonable.  This 
analysis provides greater protection for the inmate and provides a 
mechanism for review as statutorily intended. 
New Orleans is not an isolated incident.  Instead, similar infractions 
can be seen in other prosecutors’ offices like that of Orange County, 
California, where the district attorney’s office had a history of planting 
jail house informants to provide testimony against defendants.154  Such 
misconduct also occurred in numerous cases involving surrounding 
counties.155  The Las Vegas District Attorney faced questioning after his 
                                                          
Sr. held his office at the time of Curtis Kyles’s first trial in 1984). 
 152.   See generally Della Hasselle & John Simerman, Questions over Conduct of Louisiana 
Prosecutors Is Before Supreme Court, THE LENS (June 12, 2016, 9:51 PM), 
http://thelensnola.org/2016/06/12/questions-over-conduct-of-louisiana-prosecutors-is-before-
supreme-court/ (discussing the number of death sentences overturned due to prosecutorial 
misconduct and Louisiana prosecutors’ history of abuses). 
 153.   See id. 
 154.   See Paloma Esquivel, O.C. Murder Conviction Vacated After Jailhouse Snitch Hearings, 
L.A. TIMES (June 25, 2014, 3:10 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-oc-murder-
conviction-vacated-20140625-story.html (“Dekraai’s defense attorneys sought the hearing to prove 
their allegations that prosecutors and law enforcement for years engaged in a pattern of 
unconstitutionally deploying jailhouse snitches and routinely concealing their work from defense 
attorneys.”); see also Sophie, CA: Orange County DA Drops Murder Charges to Save Face and 
Keep Secrets, Attorneys Allege, THE OPEN FILE BLOG (Oct. 2, 2014), 
http://www.prosecutorialaccountability.com/2014/10/02/ca-orange-county-da-drops-murder-
charges-to-save-face-and-keep-secrets-attorneys-allege/. 
 155.   See Tracey Kaplan, Santa Clara County: Ex-Jailer Says Planting Informants Was Routine, 
MERCURY NEWS (Mar. 1, 2015, 7:46 AM), http://www.mercurynews.com/2015/03/01/santa-clara-
county-ex-jailer-says-planting-informants-was-routine/ (“A former Santa Clara County Jail official 
has claimed he routinely helped cops and prosecutors plant jailhouse informants to actively dig up 
information from suspects for about 10 years ending in the late 1990s, potentially violating a 
Supreme Court ruling that prevents the government from sending anyone to interrogate defendants 
without their lawyer being present. . . .  In the late 1980s, a scandal over the extensive use of 
jailhouse informants erupted in Los Angeles County after informant Leslie Vernon White proved 
how easily he could fake the confession of another inmate.  It sparked a grand jury investigation and 
major reforms, and the use of informants there plummeted.”). 
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history of paying witnesses surfaced.  Over a twenty-year period, 
payments were made through a slush fund for relocating witnesses, 
paying rent for witnesses, and paying a witness’s debts.156  The Supreme 
Court has ruled that such evidence must be disclosed to defense counsel 
as impeachment evidence.157  However, the Las Vegas District Attorney 
does not agree that evidence of these payments should be given to 
defense counsel.158 
Other prosecutors’ offices constitutional violations occurred during 
the trials themselves when they made improper arguments.  Because 
prosecutors bear the burden of proving the charges against the accused 
beyond a reasonable doubt, they have the first say during both opening 
statement and closing argument.  Further, they have a rebuttal argument 
after the defense closing argument.  The line between a proper and 
improper argument is not as blurred as many state courts seem to think 
they are.  Prosecutors are not permitted to shift their burden onto the 
defense,159 they may not use a defendant’s choice to remain silent as 
grounds for impeachment,160 and they are not permitted to argue 
evidence not introduced in the trial.161  However, these constitutional 
violations occur quite frequently because state courts very rarely 
overturn convictions because of these infractions.162 
                                                          
 156.   Bethany Barnes, Vegas DA’s Witness Payment Account Remains a Mystery, LAS VEGAS 
REV.-J. (Sept. 13, 2014, 8:54 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/crime/courts/vegas-das-witness-
payment-account-remains-a-mystery. 
 157.   See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972) (“Here the Government’s case 
depended almost entirely on Taliento’s testimony . . . .  Taliento’s credibility as a witness was 
therefore an important issue in the case, and evidence of any understanding or agreement as to a 
future prosecution would be relevant to his credibility and the jury was entitled to know of it.”). 
 158.   Bethany Barnes, Public Defender Blasts D.A.’s Take on Witness Rent Pay, LAS VEGAS 
REV.-J. (Aug. 21, 2014, 9:42 PM), https://www.reviewjournal.com/local/local-las-vegas/public-
defender-blasts-d-a-s-take-on-witness-rent-pay. 
 159.   See Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 131–33 (1982) (holding that burden shifting by the 
prosecution during trial is a colorable constitutional violation, but reversing the Sixth Circuit on 
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 160.   See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (“[I]t would be fundamentally unfair and a 
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 161.   See Dunlop v. United States, 165 U.S. 486, 498 (1897) (discussing the types of 
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 162.   See Alford, supra note 123, at 483–84, 486 (discussing the deterrent effect on police and 
prosecutorial misconduct when courts overturn convictions when misconduct occurs but the failure 
to do so when improper arguments occur).  But see Rodriguez v. State, 210 So. 3d 750, 757 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2017) (overturning a state court conviction based on the prosecutor’s improper closing 
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Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Alex Kozinski acted against what he saw 
as a prevalent pattern of prosecutorial misconduct.  He has consistently 
spoken about the pervasive problems in the criminal justice system.  
Many of his concerns rest with the power prosecutors have and the 
growing abuse he sees in the cases before him: 
But there are disturbing indications that a non-trivial number of 
prosecutors—and sometimes entire prosecutorial offices—engage in 
misconduct that seriously undermines the fairness of criminal trials.  
The misconduct ranges from misleading the jury, to outright lying in 
court and tacitly acquiescing or actively participating in the 
presentation of false evidence by police. 
Prosecutorial misconduct is a particularly difficult problem to deal with 
because so much of what prosecutors do is secret.  If a prosecutor fails 
to disclose exculpatory evidence to the defense, who is to know?  Or if 
a prosecutor delays disclosure of evidence helpful to the defense until 
the defendant has accepted an unfavorable plea bargain, no one will be 
the wiser.  Or if prosecutors rely on the testimony of cops they know to 
be liars, or if they acquiesce in a police scheme to create inculpatory 
evidence, it will take an extraordinary degree of luck and persistence to 
discover it—and in most cases it will never be discovered.163 
In several cases, Chief Justice Kozinski has questioned and 
admonished prosecutors who violate various constitutional protections of 
inmates. In Baca v. Adams,164 he challenged the Assistant Attorney 
General representing Adams, suggesting that the trial prosecutor should 
be charged for perjury.165  He questioned the respondent as to why the 
Attorney General’s Office continued to defend a conviction with such 
pervasive prosecutorial misconduct including the introduction of 
knowingly false testimony.166  Now, more courts are referring 
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prosecutors to state bar associations for discipline.167  The current 
practice of publicizing and reporting to state bars the malfeasance of 
prosecutors is crucial because so few courts are taking action to curb this 
misconduct in individual cases.168  When prosecutors are unaccountable 
for their misdeeds, the lack of accountability trickles down to law 
enforcement, who become lax in their abuses. 
Chief Justice Kozinski’s recognition of police misconduct mirrors 
his stance against prosecutorial misbehavior.169  For example, his 
majority opinion in the Milke case illustrates the flaws in the state court’s 
application of federal constitutional law.  There, he described the police 
malfeasance that occurred during the interrogation of Milke in violation 
of Miranda v. Arizona where warnings were either not given, an 
invocation to the right to trial was ignored, or there was a question as to 
the validity of the confession.170  For Milke, she challenged that the 
confession ever occurred as Detective Saldate testified it did.171  Of 
concern for the court was the failure of the state court to recognize the 
importance of Detective Saldate’s history of disobeying constitutional 
protections during interrogations, abusing his authority, and being 
internally reprimanded for his behavior.172  The court’s opinion described 
the other victims who suffered because of Detective Saldate.173  Because 
no substantive actions were taken by his superiors, Detective Saldate 
continued to abuse his authority in numerous cases.  Countless victims’ 
constitutional rights were violated because an officer disregarded the law 
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and his ethical obligation.  Worse yet, Debra Milke spent years on death 
row because of his wrongdoing. 
Violations of Miranda are often unsuccessful for inmates given the 
difficulties they have in challenging police throughout the criminal 
justice system.  For example, Milke requested evidence throughout her 
state court proceedings, but was denied.174  It was only through the 
efforts of her defense counsel searching court records independently 
about Saldate’s former cases did much of her impeachment evidence 
come to light.175  Saldate’s abuses spanning several cases were known to 
his superiors, yet very little was done to protect those charges against his 
abuses.  Besides the battle to have interrogations recorded at the outset176 
the factual predicate without such evidence is limited. 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that Sessoms requested an 
attorney during his interrogation twice before police read him Miranda 
warnings.177  The police continued to interrogate him despite his request 
for legal counsel and their acknowledgment of that request.178  The court 
found that the state court’s denial of Sessoms’ motion for suppression for 
violating Miranda was not entitled to deference due to it being an 
unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent.179  The detectives 
recorded their interrogation of Sessoms, providing him independent 
records of what transpired and allowing him to provide the factual basis 
of precisely how his constitutional rights were violated.180  While the 
state courts failed to apply Miranda v. Arizona properly, hope was not 
lost to Sessoms, who obtained relief in federal habeas corpus.181  
However, both cases are anomalies rather than the rule.  The ability to 
provide documents and transcripts established how the state courts erred 
and provided a means to surpass the deference standard. 
Official misconduct is often a systemic violation that impacts 
numerous inmates based on the failing of the state courts and state actors 
to hold bad actors accountable.  The harms stack against an inmate 
because state officials exceed the scope of their constitutional authority 
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2017  FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS & SYSTEMIC OFFICIAL MISCONDUCT 35 
toward a defendant during the investigation or prosecution of the case.  
Their actions affect the ability to raise a viable defense.  Further, the state 
officials inhibit the state courts from properly evaluating the case during 
the appeals.  State court judges fail to see the pattern of misconduct or 
appreciate its significance under federal law.182  As the Ninth Circuit held 
in Milke, the pattern of misconduct establishes the unreasonableness of 
the factual determination of the state court.  In such instances, federal 
habeas corpus is the only means to achieve relief.  The next section 
discusses how federal courts should handle state court merits rulings 
when dealing with widespread misconduct. 
B. The Proper Application of Deference with Systemic Misconduct 
Legal scholars have debated how to streamline or adjust federal 
habeas corpus proceedings to address systemic abuses or patterns of 
misconduct.  By doing so, inmates who are unable to fully articulate the 
extent of their constitutional violations could shift some of the burden to 
respondents to answer for their bad behavior.  However, many of the 
suggested changes are flawed because they eliminate an individual’s 
right to relief on official misconduct.  Because many of these systemic 
abuses are known by attorneys and courts, an inmate should be able to 
raise a constitutional claim by providing this systemic evidence in their 
federal petition.  Given the Pinholster restrictions, federal courts should 
review systematic claims under § 2254(d)(2) assessing whether the state 
court’s factual analysis was unreasonable.  The failure of the state court 
to consider the often longstanding impact of state actors’ malfeasance 
constitutes unreasonable action.  This allows federal courts to discuss the 
overarching misconduct within an individual’s federal habeas corpus 
petition. 
A few scholars suggest wholesale changes to federal habeas corpus, 
including significantly curtailing its application to non-capital 
defendants183 or limiting its application to actual innocence claims.184  
Another scholar advocates for streamlining federal habeas corpus by 
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limiting it to addressing systemic violations.185  However, these 
viewpoints take away the crux of what federal habeas is, a legal 
mechanism for state inmates to raise their constitutional claims against 
their conviction in federal court.186  Federal habeas corpus must take into 
account when systemic violations of constitutional rights deprives 
inmates not only of the ability to factually substantiate their claims, but 
when they play an integral part as to why they are convicted in the first 
place.  As shown previously, state courts are ill-equipped to handle these 
claims or choose not to do so.  Both the state court process and often the 
factual basis of the claim are unconstitutionally limited due to state 
actions.  Therefore, it is incumbent upon federal courts to address these 
claims. 
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Pinholster discussed the likelihood 
that evidence not considered by the state courts in either direct appeal or 
post-conviction could not be considered when the inmate reaches federal 
habeas corpus.187  Evidence fitting within that framework is much more 
likely to occur in systemic official misconduct cases.  In this context, 
indiscriminate application of the deference standard is problematic 
because the state court decision, or lack thereof, is an unreasonable 
application of the facts when compared to the state court record.  An 
inmate lacking resources and deprived of the factual predicate through 
police or prosecutorial malfeasance, or both, of their constitutional claim 
necessitates applying a lenient application of § 2254(d)(2) or de novo 
review. 
Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court must consider the entirety of the 
state court record involving the facts presented by the petitioner.  This 
requires a thorough examination of not just the specific facts alleged 
along with the supporting evidence, but the state court process as well.188  
This includes whether the state court held a “full and fair” hearing or 
made factual determinations if the state court does not hold a hearing.189  
A state appellate and collateral process that lacks fundamental fairness to 
fully present their official misconduct claims along with the facts 
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supporting them is unable to conduct an examination as the AEDPA 
intended.190  By providing state courts the first opportunity to remedy 
problematic convictions, the AEDPA is willing to defer to those rulings 
provided the state courts reasonably apply federal law.  However, this 
does not happen when police and prosecutors act inappropriately during 
the pretrial process, adjudication, and beyond conviction.  When a state 
system disregards a federal constitutional provision, it violates the basic 
purpose of federal judges by restricting their ability to overturn such 
decisions.191 
As the Ninth Circuit did in Milke, such analysis of how the facts 
were improperly assessed, including the state’s failure to disclose, can 
result in relief for an aggrieved inmate.  Police and prosecutorial 
misconduct should not be rewarded with deference when an inmate can 
demonstrate systemic patterns of behavior.  This is especially true when 
a longstanding pattern of misconduct exists.  In Miller-El v. Dretke, the 
Supreme Court recognized systemic racial peremptory challenges as part 
of the (d)(2) analysis resulting in relief.192  Federal courts should utilize 
this fact-intensive analysis where the record is clear and inmates can 
articulate the pattern of wrongdoing. 
Allowing the state courts to deny access while shielding errant police 
and prosecutors not only destroys the credibility of the criminal justice 
system, but it also signals that constitutional protections are no longer 
relevant to people improperly convicted.  The fact that official 
misconduct occurred in 52% of exonerations in this country provides an 
indication of the depths of the problem.193  When an inmate can explain 
how official misconduct affects her case but needs some assistance in 
federal court, deference should not prevent her from doing so.  Factual 
development would not open the floodgates of new cases.194  Deference 
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would still apply but not stand in direct opposition to the overarching 
goal of the Great Writ. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Police and prosecutorial misconduct occurs more often than most 
people realize.  When it does happen, it affects countless defendants who 
may be innocent, have viable defenses to their charges, or—at 
minimum— deserve their honest day in court.  Yet, when police refuse to 
stop questioning a suspect after they ask for an attorney or a prosecutor 
makes an inappropriate argument during a trial, state courts may 
disregard these federal constitutional safeguards with little concern for its 
implications.  Federal habeas corpus, once the ultimate check against 
state indifference has become a rubber stamp for state court decisions.  
Deference should not trump a valid constitutional violation when an 
inmate can show how a police or prosecutor acted inappropriately.  A 
justice system that allows it to do so makes constitutional protections 
meaningless. 
 
